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LAW DAY ADDRESS*
by
John N. Mitchell
Attorney General of the United States

J

AM especially happy to be here because a lawyer cannot help being
inspired at the dedication of such a fine new law library. It is not too
much to say that a college or a law school is no better than its library,
which should attempt to provide the students with the sum of man's
knowledge in its field. The bricks and mortar that make up this building
are symbolic of the pieces of information-the hard-won facts-which
together make up the whole edifice of civilization.
This observation bears strongly upon the subject of my remarks today.
As most of you know, at this time of year Law Day speeches are being
made at law schools and before bar associations around the country.
This year the Law Day theme established by the American Bar Association is, "Change Through Law and Reason." I thoroughly endorse this
proposition. I would like to confine my remarks to one aspect of it, which
is this: In the national dialogue and ferment that accompanies change,
let us get the facts before we act. Law and reason cannot even spring
to action except from a platform of facts.
It would seem unnecessary to utter this simple truism, except that so
often today it is ignored in the most serious national issues. We find emotion and intuition in the saddle, while truth is trampled in the dust. As
a nation we cannot continue on this retrogressive course without inviting
grave dangers that so far we have generally avoided through a respect
for the facts.
Most of you in this audience have been or are being trained in the
law. You know that the practice of law is built on precise informationof which the rules of evidence are the most striking example. You know
what the television character, Sergeant Friday, meant by his familiar
plea during investigations, "Just the facts, ma'am."
Law schools have had the responsibility, among others, of instilling in
their students this devotion to the facts. On Law Day may I take the
liberty of reminding you that the hallmark of the lawyer is a healthy
skepticism when confronted with broad conclusions-no matter how
often they are repeated and no matter how generally they seem to be
accepted. We lawyers must ask: "Who said it?" "Why did he say it?"
"What is the proof?"
Lawyers schooled in this discipline also have a duty that goes beyond
the courtroom and the law office. They have a responsibility, when their
communities are embroiled in public issues, to promote among their fellow
citizens this same devotion to the facts. It is a prerequisite for any sane
and worthy resolution to public problems.
* Delivered at the dedication of the Underwood Law Library, Southern Methodist University
School of Law, Dallas, Texas, on April 30, 1971.
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I feel strongly about this because of the wild irrationality, the unfounded accusations, that have recently characterized some national issues.
This refusal to hear the facts is not confined to any special element in
American life. We find examples in the halls of Congress, on the campuses,
in the news media-wherever public issues are debated. Let me give you
two such examples:
Case No. I-The Black Panther Genocide Fraud. In December 1969 the
attorney for the Black Panthers, Charles R. Garry, stated publicly that
police across the nation had murdered twenty-eight Panthers in "a national
scheme by various agencies of the government" to "commit genocide upon
members of the Black Panther Party." With no proof whatever, a number of public figures repeated the claim of this biased source as though
it were accepted fact. A state legislator charged that the scheme "was
arranged by the federal police apparatus." Soon the twenty-eight murders
were reported as a fact, not as an allegation, by the New York Times, the
Washington Post, and many other news media. One national magazine
stated that the Department of Justice had joined the police and "escalated
the drive" against the Panthers.
These were the charges-widely accepted and believed. Whenever our
Department of Justice representatives met with campus groups, they
would invariably be questioned about the twenty-eight murders and the
genocide scheme. But what were the facts?
A few days after the Panther attorney's original charge, a Chicago
Tribune reporter named Ronald Koziol exposed it as a fraud. But his
story was ignored in the onrush of vilification against law enforcement
agencies. More than a year after the original allegation, it was investigated
by writer Edward Jay Epstein, who reported his findings in the New
Yorker magazine of February 13, 1971.

With old-fashioned thoroughness, these two reporters independently
started from the same base-the rather obvious journalistic step of requesting a list of the twenty-eight alleged murders. It turned out that
twenty-eight had just "seemed to be a safe number," according to Garry's
own admission, and that the most names he could scrape together was
nineteen. The investigators checked on each of these nineteen and as Mr.
Epstein reported it:
One had been killed by a storekeeper in resisting a robbery, not by
police.
One was shot in an argument with "friends," not by police.
One was shot by his wife, not by police.
Another was executed by other Black Panthers, not by police.
Four were killed in a shootout with members of a rival black militant
organization, not by police.
One was shot in an unsolved case, by a pistol later found in a raid
on a Black Panther headquarters.
There were eight other cases which involved crimes or street shootouts,
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in which the police believed they were dealing with criminals as such and
had no reason to think they were encountering Black Panthers. Six of
these Panthers were shot by policemen who were already seriously wounded
and were fighting for their lives. According to Epstein's report, two policemen were killed and fourteen were wounded in the eight cases.
In only two Panther deaths were the police conducting a planned raid.
One was killed as the police entered after he had fired a shotgun through
the door, and the other appears to have been hit by a stray police bullet
that went through two intervening walls.
Thus, no deaths can be attributed to what the Panther attorney called
a "national scheme" of "genocide." The fraud has been laid bare, and to
its credit the Washington Post made a full admission of error. But this
is small compensation for the sorry spectacle of supposedly responsible
public figures and the press repeating the most damaging charges without
the facts.
The genocide fraud is a classic example of the triumph-hopefully, a
temporary triumph-of the Big Lie over the Simple Truth. It operates on
the old principle that if you tell a falsehood long enough and often
enough, it becomes accepted as fact. I am reminded of George Orwell's
1984 and his language of "Newspeak," in which words assume opposite
meanings-wrong becomes right, and fiction becomes truth. I believe
that we Americans are not now, and never will be, ready to speak that
language.
Case No. 2-The "No-Knock" Scare. I refer to a provision, supported
by the Department of Justice, in the District of Columbia Court Reform
and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, and in the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. It spelled out the circumstances under which officers making an arrest or searching premises with
a warrant must announce their identity and purpose, and when they need
not. In the latter case they must show a judge probable cause for believing that the suspect may destroy evidence, or attack the officers, or
try to escape, if they announce themselves. If the judge is convinced he
can then authorize the unannounced entry as part of his warrant.
When this proposal came before Congress it stirred a great hue and
cry. Opponents labeled it the "no-knock" law. Many of them ignored

the requirement for court approval. They conjured up images of Hitler's
storm troopers kicking in the doors of their trembling victims. The pro-

vision was said to violate the fourth amendment against unreasonable
searches and seizures. A former Attorney General was quoted in a newspaper interview as saying, "The no-knock law is immoral."
These were the accusations. What are the facts?
Actually, the provision gives more citizen protection, not less. Previously, under federal case law an officer about to make an arrest or search
could decide for himself whether the circumstances justified his entering
without announcing himself. In the District of Columbia, case law had
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prohibited unannounced entry under certain conditions and indicated
others in which the policeman could use his discretion in entering without
announcing himself. In a majority of states this same latitude has been
recognized either by statute or in case law, and in others such discretion
has been practiced without specific formal guidelines.
In the case of Ker v. California!in 1963, the United States Supreme
Court upheld an unannounced entry to prevent the destruction of evidence. It took the occasion to declare that an officer should announce
himself as a general rule, but it set forth specific exceptions in which he
could decide not to announce himself.
In all of this prevailing practice and legal support, it was the officer
who was given the on-the-spot discretion on whether or not to announce
himself, subject only to possible later judicial review. But under the new
D. C. and drug control acts, this discretion is taken from the officer and
given to an independent judge, in the same manner that a judge decides
beforehand whether there is probable cause for an arrest or search warrant.
For the first time, this hazy area of citizen privacy has been clarifiedand decidedly in favor of further protection to the citizen. In fact, the
provision is more restrictive on the police than a similar provision in a
draft federal drug bill proposed by the Department of Justice during the
term of a former Attorney General-the one who now says the present
law is immoral.
In short, citizen protection against "no-knock" entry is greater than
it was before, but the Department of Justice is accused of inventing a
new form of repression. Citizen protection means citizen repression in
the "Newspeak" language of 1984.
These are only two public issues that arose out of a shocking contempt
for truth and a cheap surrender to instinct. Nor do I blame the public,
so much as the sharp erosion of professionalism among many who have
the public's ear. Whether parents or students, the people are no better
informed than the quality of their information sources. I am especially
aware of this when I meet with student groups, and when Justice Department spokesmen join campus forums.
Time and time again students ask, "What are, you doing about the
concentration camps?"
Time and time again the patient answer is, "There are no concentration
camps in this country, and if we can help it there never will be!"
The other day a Congressman, after claiming that the FBI tapped the
telephones of Congressmen and Senators, offered the evidence that the
telephone company reported that he had no tap on his line, but he said
it always denies this when the FBI taps a line, and so the "no" report
was really a "yes" report. Again, "no" means "yes" in the "Newspeak"
language of 1984.
Despite the transparency of the Congressman's so-called information,
despite the complete lack of evidence that the FBI has ever wiretapped

1971]

LAW DAY ADDRESS

the phones of Congressmen, despite the Justice Department's unequivocal
denial of the charge, the day after the Congressman's speech a student
asked me, "Why are you tapping the telephones of Congressmen?"
At least I am glad to have the question, because it gives me the opportunity to compete with the student's own source of information-whatever that may be. I am happy to report that, time and time again, after
getting the other side of the story for the first time, students have gone
away with a different view of the matter. And I am also happy to say
that this unfamiliarity with the facts is not particularly noticeable among
law students, trained to dig out evidence from a variety of sources.
Ladies and gentlemen, let us recall that the advancement of man has
been measured by his ability to discover and apply accurate information.
Since the sixteenth century the rise of the scientific method of experimentation and proof has provided the basis for all the physical knowledge
on which our technical capabilities stand. Beginning in the Middle Ages
the development of trial by jury and the rules of evidence provided the
same basis of fact in the world of law. All the major professions-science,
medicine, engineering, accounting, and not least, law-have become true
professions in proportion as they have come to identify, respect, and
make use of facts.
Can we now allow ourselves, in our national decisions, to abandon
fact in favor of emotion? We cannot, any more than the medical profession would revert to the age of the witch doctor, or our courts return
to trial by combat.
Most especially I am gravely concerned that some of those who, in
public debate, have shown the least regard for facts have been attorneysthose in whom the respect for facts should be ingrained to the very marrow. And we find courtrooms-where hard evidence and sworn testimony
should alone rule the results-turned into theaters for histrionics and
even violence. I am reminded of the somber warning of Roscoe Pound,
writing two decades ago: "In jurisprudence we are dealing with experience developed by reason and reason tested by experience. The seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries put their faith in reason. The nineteenth century,
in the main line of its thought, put its faith in experience. The twentieth
century has been putting its faith in intuition."
If this be the trend in our time, it is my fervent hope that it can be
reversed before we as a nation follow it into some desperate mistakes.
Rather, I would remind America's practitioners of law of that fundamental Latin maxim: "Ex facto jus oritur"-"The law arises out of the
fact." "That ancient rule," Mr. Justice Brandeis told us, "must prevail
in order that we may have a system of living law."

